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Abstract
This article contributes to the field of evolutionary macroeconomics by
highlighting the dynamic interlinkages between micro-meso-macro with a Veb-
lenian meso foundation in an agent-based macroeconomic model. Consumption
is dependent on endogenously changing social class and signaling, such as
bandwagon, Veblen and snob effects. In particular, we test the macroeconomic
effects of this meso foundation in a generic agent-based model of a closed
artificial economy. The model is stock-flow consistent and builds upon local
decision heuristics of heterogeneous agents characterized by bounded rationality
and satisficing behavior. These agents include a multitude of households
(workers and capitalists), firms, banks as well as a capital goods firm, a
government and a central bank. Simulation experiments indicate co-
evolutionary dynamics between signaling-by-consuming and firm specialization
that eventually effect employment and consumer prices, as well as other
macroeconomic aggregates.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary economists have traditionally focused on the supply side, following
the Schumpeterian avenue of economic analysis (Schumpeter 1934). Nelson and
Winter (1982), using this approach, created a theoretical core with an analytical
apparatus that has inspired, among others, De Bresson (1987), Dosi et al. (1988),
Saviotti and Metcalfe (1991) and Witt (1992). Recently, this Schumpeterian
theoretical core was also embedded into a macroeconomic framework (in partic-
ular, an agent-based one) as shown by Dosi et al. (2010). Otherwise, evolutionary
economics is deeply rooted in the Veblenian avenue of economic analysis that
dealt originally with the interrelations of consumer behavior, social class and
institutional change (Veblen 1899). Even though the latter research strand found
continuous improvements (Tool 1977; Bush 1987; Gruchy 1990; Hodgson 1998),
it did not develop a common analytical apparatus, nor has there been any proper
application in a macroeconomic framework. Our contribution aims to close this
research gap by highlighting Veblenian consumption dynamics in an agent-based
macroeconomic model.
In this undertaking we basically follow the methodology of agent-based mac-
roeconomics that received increased attention in the Great Recession. As argued
by Stiglitz (2015), the design of macroeconomic theory has to change substantially
in order to arrive at a meaningful economic policy. The idea to integrate com-
plexity and heterogeneity into macroeconomics has been articulated at several
occasions over the last ten years; see especially Tesfatsion and Judd (2006),
LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008), Farmer and Foley (2009), Delli Gatti et al.
(2010), Kirman (2011), Stiglitz and Gallegati (2011) and Dosi (2012). Many have
already followed this agenda and brought these claims to life in agent-based
macroeconomic models; compare Dosi et al. (2010), Ciarli et al. (2010), Cincotti
et al. (2010), Delli Gatti et al. (2011), Seppecher (2012), Lengnick (2013), Riccetti
et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2014), Rengs and Wäckerle (2014, 2017) and Caiani
et al. (2016) for the recent publication of a new benchmark model in this realm.
Evolutionary economists have started to develop their own theory of consump-
tion within the last 15 years (compare Chai 2016), as illustrated by Witt (2001),
Nelson and Consoli (2010), Chai and Moneta (2010), Valente (2012) and Kapeller
et al. (2013). One of the first microeconomic models in this evolutionary direction
was developed by Cowan et al. (1997) with a focus on bandwagon and snob
effects in a heterogeneous population of consumers. Malerba et al. (2007) and
Safarzynska and van den Bergh (2010) provided a basic simulation model of the
co-evolution of industries, technological innovation, niche markets and ‘experi-
mental users’. The latter article already introduced a differentiation between a
“snob” and a “network effect” in the social mediation of preferences. However,
this line of research has never found integration into macroeconomic models, with
the exception of Ciarli et al. (2010) and Lorentz et al. (2016). Technically
speaking, we do not know much about the endogenous welfare effects of
signaling-by-consuming effects. Elsewhere, macroeconomists have conducted
similar welfare experiments following neoclassical (Fisher and Hof 2005;
Wendner 2010) as well as post-Keynesian approaches (van Treeck and Sturn
2012; Kapeller and Schütz 2015). However, the latter approaches have only
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limited explanatory potential for a deeper analysis of structuration processes at
work, since they build on an aggregated representative agent model that has come
under serious criticism for its explanatory limitations (Kirman 1992).To this
extent, aggregated macroeconomic models face crucial limitations in addressing
the interactive dynamics of imitating and innovating heterogeneous agents central
to endogenous economic development (Veblen 1899; Schumpeter 1934).
Instead, we follow an evolutionary macroeconomic approach – considered as
integral to the larger research program of evolutionary political economy
(Hanappi and Scholz-Wäckerle 2017; Hanappi et al. 2017) – with endogenous
consumer behavior dependent on social class. Economic agents are characterized
as heterogeneous, diverse and boundedly rational. Their behavior depends on
cognitive decision heuristics as well as on social norms and imitation. In this
regard, we follow roughly a micro-meso-macro framework (Dopfer et al. 2004;
Elsner 2007; Dopfer et al. 2016), highlighting the social mediation of consumer
preferences as a meso foundation in a complex evolving macroeconomic system
(Scholz-Wäckerle 2017). The approach of evolutionary macroeconomics was
originally formulated by Foster (1987) and was revived quite recently by
Verspagen (2002), Foster (2011), Dosi (2012) and Hanappi (2014). While Dosi
et al. (2010) as well as Ciarli et al. (2010) do not explicitly refer to evolutionary
macroeconomics, their models implicitly follow the elementary evolutionary
blocks, as presented in Dosi (2012). The model presented in this article focuses
on a Veblenian meso foundation and thereby contributes to evolutionary macro-
economics with a novel analysis of the dynamic implications of social distinction
on the co-evolution of firm size, income/wealth distribution and macroeconomic
aggregates such as unemployment and GDP growth. Computational simulation
experiments indicate that a wide adoption of conspicuous consumption behavior
in the household population drives the macroeconomic system into turmoil,
leading to unsustainable unemployment as well as severe losses in aggregate
demand. We also show the simultaneous microeconomic effects on firm special-
ization due to different consumption behavior.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The characteristics of the
Veblenian meso foundation and the corresponding class dynamics are expressed in
Section 2. The general structure of the agent-based macroeconomic model, the
goods market, the labor market, the credit market as well as the government and
the central bank are explained in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the computational
simulation experiments and its results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Household behavior: the Veblenian meso foundation
of the agent-based macroeconomic model
Veblen’s (1899) ‘Theory of the leisure class’ provides a model of conspicuous
consumption behavior with basic political economic origins where consumer
preferences are a matter of social rank. In contrast to the Marxian model of social
class based upon the conflict over the societal means of production and the further
development of the productive forces (Marx 1867) – thereby reshaping the
relations of production – Veblen’s model focuses on leisure time and on
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property-based status. ‘To own property is to have status and honor’ (Trigg 2001:
100). The noble leisure class consumes conspicuously and thereby aims to show
its wealth in public, whereas the ignoble industrious class is always one step
behind in emulating this behavior. As shown by Trigg (2001), this economic
motive of ‘social distinction’ is not just bound to the American society of the
nineteenth century. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu empirically demonstrated that
taste – conceived here as a consumer preference – is subject to social mediation
and class fractions (Bourdieu 1984). To this extent, social distinction provides an
illustrative example of cultural hegemony, a way for the ruling class to dominate
the aesthetics of the working class. Consumer preferences represent cultural
reflections of class conflict in capitalist societies and contribute to the social
reproduction of economic inequality (Bourdieu 1998). Trigg (2001) explained that
Thorstein Veblen considered this social emulation of consumer preferences simply
as a trickle-down process, while Pierre Bourdieu pointed out that a trickle-around
process was at work.
The model presented in Section 3 allows for the computational simulation of
these features and therefore differs from other agent-based macroeconomic ap-
proaches in a number of ways, notably including distinct ownership (capitalist and
working class) and consumption behavior following different norms. In addition,
the model can generate the emergence of specialization patterns of firms reacting
on variety in consumption. In particular, a firm can, for example, initially produce
goods that mainly serve basic needs, and over time shift to serving wants. The
demand elasticities for each individual firm’s goods are thus changing over time,
resulting from shifts in the perception of individual households. This avoids the
more common approach of starting with a fixed classification of firms or sectors
with particular goods that permanently retain their character. Our approach is
parsimonious (simplified) without sacrificing richness in explanatory power.
The meso foundation is described as dependent on agent networks and their
dynamics. This causes consumption behavior to take the form of imitation
(bandwagon effects) and signaling-by-consuming effects by different consumer
classes. In the latter case, we consider Veblen effects (conspicuous consump-
tion) and snob effects, both with a focus on luxury goods, where the first is
about high price and the second about rare goods (Leibenstein 1950). House-
holds do not optimize their consumption behavior (Valente 2012) but are
instead assumed to be rather loyal, or rigid, in their choice of vendors, while
also being open to new opportunities. Their decisions (namely, which firms’
products to buy) are linked to two different motivational aspirations: needs and
wants (Witt 2001). The tendency to buy from a specific firm then depends on
the respective aspiration, the current product’s relative price and the firm’s
reputation. The latter two are based on well-documented consumer behaviors:
bandwagon, Veblen and snob effects. The consumption decision differs with
respect to social class, with capitalist households and wealthy workers having a
higher saving rate than workers.
Households choose their sellers in a boundedly rational way, by having a
shortlist of preferred ‘vendors’ at any given time (similar to Lengnick 2013).
They try to buy equal amounts from each firm on their list, as firms’ stock and
household budgets permit. Households actually employ two lists, one for needs
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and one for wants. Initially, each of these lists consists of n randomly chosen
firms. During the simulation, households change the composition of these lists
based on their preferences, slowly improving them in each period (an artificial
timespan which loosely represents a month). As preferences are assumed to be
different for needs and wants, these two lists tend to contain different firms after
some time. In the case of needs, households will replace a firm that could not
deliver – because of insufficient production or inventory – by another, randomly
chosen one. In the wants case, households do not immediately replace a firm that
could not deliver, as wants involve goods that are highly sought after. Instead,
they wait up to three periods before randomly choosing a new one.
If a seller (firm) is considered for potential replacement and is perceived to be
better (by some small but noticeable degree) in terms of price and firm reputation
(implying a utility premium for a household consuming that firm’s good) than the
one selected for potential elimination from the list, the replacement is effectuated.
The rules employed in this comparison partially depend on prices and firm
reputation (market shares) as well as on personal wealth, following the dynamics
of imitation and signaling-by-consuming (conspicuous consumption à la Veblen
1899). Technically speaking, we assume that there are ‘signaling-by-consuming’
effects at work, i.e. ‘…households engage in consumption not only for intrinsic
value but also for its value as a signal’, following Heffetz (2011: 1101), who
provides evidence in support of this household behavior.
In particular, Heffetz (2011), on the one hand, extends the typical neoclassical
consumption model by introducing the ‘visibility of a consumption good’ that is
determining the agent’s elasticity to purchase it. On the other hand, he shows the
empirical validity of this model with U.S. household data on the relation between
‘expenditure visibility’ and ‘elasticity estimates’, where ‘…the former can indeed
predict the latter’ (Heffetz 2011: 1102). Otherwise, the author adds, ‘…the
evidence is limited to one country, at one point in time, with consumer expen-
ditures divided into only 29 categories’ (Heffetz 2011: 1117). However, we are
confident that these results will be replicated for other countries once the data on
consumption expenditure become more robust and can be analyzed in depth.1
The resulting Engel curves – relations between total expenditures and expendi-
ture for a particular good – for a changing consumption basket (Heffetz 2011:
1108–1109) provide first evidence why a certain commodity is purchased as a
necessity (need) and the other as a luxury (want). To this extent, the empirical
analysis exercised by Heffetz (2011) delivers empirical correlations for Engel’s
law: ‘…the poorer the family is, the larger the budget share it spends on
nourishment’ (Chai and Moneta 2010: 225). In the following, we take this
analysis as empirical foundation for the social mediation of consumer preferences
in our model, i.e. we explicitly model the observed ‘signaling-by-consuming’ in
an agent-based way and then further specify it following different effects such as
bandwagon, Veblen and snob.
In this context, we follow, on the one hand Veblen’s general suggestion of
trickle-down effects in social structure (Trigg 2001), due to working-class
1 Compare recent work on the “Household Finance and Consumption Survey for the European Union” by
Fessler et al. (2014) and Rehm et al. (2016).
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consumers imitating capitalist-class consumers. On the other hand, we are inspired
by Leibenstein (1950), who specified consumption dynamics as resembling a
bandwagon effect (imitation of other consumers) and contrasted it to the
signaling-by-consuming effect described by Thorstein Veblen (luxury consump-
tion) and snob effect (consumption striving for rare goods – ‘exclusiveness’). We
model Veblenian consumer dynamics in a similar manner as Kapeller and Schütz
(2015) but with substantially more details on differences in quantity and price
effects as well as about the underlying social dynamics. Additionally, we employ a
snob effect that roughly represents Bourdieu’s (1984) model of trickle-around
(Trigg 2001). Snob consumption is modeled as pure distinction, as the opposite
to the bandwagon effect. This distinction is crucial for our setting, because it
avoids potential lock-ins in market dynamics. Due to this effect, even already
established firms may crash after many years and allow for a complete
restructuring of the economy.
‘Any real market for semi durable or durable goods will most likely contain
consumers that are subject to one or a combination of the effects discussed
heretofore.’ Leibenstein (1950: 205) concludes that there are four possible
combinations, dependent on price (normal price and Veblen effect) and firm
reputation (bandwagon and snob effect). We extend his framework by including
needs and wants aspirations as well as social class. This leads us to combinations
of aspiration (wants and needs) and social class (workers, wealthy workers,
capitalists); compare Fig. 1.
Wright (2015) distinguishes between three different modes of class analysis:
Marxian, Weberian and stratification class analysis. The Marxian class analysis
associates classes with its ‘systemic level of power’ and the ‘locations within the
relations of domination and exploitation in production’ (Wright 2015: 13); it
links it to the ‘conflict over production’. The Weberian class analysis focuses on
the institutional level of power and locates it in the ‘conflict over distribution’.
Eventually, the stratification mode of class analysis highlights the ‘situational
level of power’ and indicates class as ‘…how to best realize interests under fixed
Fig. 1 Signaling-by-consuming effects dependent on social class
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rules’. Wright (2015: x). The latter approach obviously works at the individual
level and it would literally allow an infinite number of social classes. The
Veblenian and Bourdieusian system of social class fits perfectly into this situa-
tional approach. The Weberian system addresses what Wright (2015: 6) calls
‘opportunity hoarding’ and is related to the meritocratic society that creates
social closure via skills, education or other criteria of job exclusion. This model
of social class is represented in the agent-based macroeconomic model of Ciarli
et al. (2010) and Lorentz et al. (2016: 225), where ‘firms are composed of
distinct hierarchies of labor’. The consumer preferences differ with regard to
these job levels, but are not socially mediated. The model we present here
explicitly implements ownership and is thereby able to address conflicts over
production as well. In particular, we implement a mixture of Marxian classes and
Veblenian social stratification. McIntyre (1992: 43) emphasizes that ‘Marx un-
derstood the social construction of needs in a manner that partly anticipates
Veblen. … Marx argues that conspicuous consumption can convince financiers
of the likelihood of loans being repaid, giving capitalists access to more credit,
or credit on better terms’. Eventually, our model features basic material as well
as cultural properties of consumption in capitalist production systems (Fine
2002). Capitalists gain individual dividends from firm profits and workers gain
income from wages. In our model, we do not distinguish workers by skill or
education and job level, but by income and wealth; hence we feature a middle
class representing wealthy workers.
Changes within social class are endogenously possible (capitalists may go
bankrupt with their firm, wealthy workers may found a firm, etc.), which will not
be recognized by the society immediately, meaning, in particular, that if there is
a change in social class, it happens with a lag (set at three months). Workers,
wealthy workers and capitalists have different preferences and behaviors, as
highlighted in Fig. 1. Worker consumption has a high normal price effect
(indicating a strong preference for the cheap over the expensive) and a low
bandwagon effect. Workers imitate the behavior of all needs consumers. Worker
want aspirations have a low normal price effect (indicating a weak preference for
the cheap over the expensive) and a high bandwagon effect (they imitate the
capitalist wants aspirations), while wealthy workers follow the same bandwagon
and consume showing a weak Veblen effect (i.e. they weakly prefer the expen-
sive over the cheap).
Finally, capitalist (firm and bank owners’) needs are triggered partially by a
snob effect (searching for rare goods – inverted imitation) and partially by a
normal price effect. Capitalist wants work with the same partial snob effect but
additionally with a Veblen effect (they prefer the expensive over the cheap).
Consumption behavior is thus not static but a co-evolving process between
behaviors of consumers and the social structure.
As indicated before, our model households employ shortlists of preferred firms
for each consumption case. These lists are updated every period by considering a
random firm, not yet part of the shortlist, and comparing the utility of purchasing
from this specific firm with that of purchasing from a random firm on the shortlist.
This evaluation follows the behavioral modes (as described above and sketched in
Fig. 1) and thus differs for the household social class and consumption aspiration.
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As an exemplary case for how the utility is derived for the worker needs in period
t, see the following equations:
b1;i;t ¼
pmax;t−pi;t
pmax;t−pmin;t
 !
ð1Þ
b2; j;t ¼ mmax;t−mj;tmmax; t−mmin;t
 
ð2Þ
b3;i;t ¼ vi;t−vmin;tvmax;t−vmin;t
 
ð3Þ
Ui; j;t ¼ b1;i;tb2; j;tξ þ b3;i;t 1−ξð Þ ð4Þ
where i denotes a firm, j denotes the household and t the time period. Now b1, i, t
represents the firm’s normalized relative price in comparison to the prices of all
other firms and b2, j, t represents the household’s normalized relative wealth in
relation to all other households. Furthermore, b3, i, t represents the firm’s normalized
reputation, while v is calculated from past sales; in this exemplary case of worker
needs, it directly corresponds to firms’ market shares to reflect the bandwagon
effect. Finally, the utility Ui, j, t is derived by weighting the price component b1, i, t
with the relative wealth b1, j, t and the parameter ξ, then by adding the firm’s
reputation and weighting it with (1 − ξ). By choosing ξ in a meaningful way (ξ =
0.75 in our simulations), we arrive at a combined utility, which makes households in
the worker needs case strongly prefer cheaper firms (which is less important for
wealthier households) and at the same time less strongly prefer relatively successful
firms. The remaining four cases of worker wants, wealthy worker wants, capitalist
needs and wants are defined similarly; compare Appendix 3.
3 The general structure of the agent-based macroeconomic model
In our model, agents are heterogeneous and endogenously adapt their behavior in
terms of bounded rationality (Simon 1996: 38; 166), following satisficing rules
(Simon 1996: 27–30). The model does not contain any aggregate exogenous
(re)distribution function from top down, i.e. the markets are self-organizing
systems and thus interdependently develop from the bottom up. The basic object
categories and their relations are shown in Fig. 2.
Firms and households interact on goods and labor markets. Firms produce and
sell a homogeneous good – representing a fictitious basket of diverse goods – to
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households. The good is produced with the same production inputs (physical
capital and labor), but may differ with regard to branding and price from firm to
firm. All households have to satisfy their basic needs in every period and thus
always try to buy the minimum amount for subsistence consumption (while trying
to keep a reserve worth one period of subsistence consumption). However,
households can demonstrate their wealth in conspicuous terms and buy additional
quantities above subsistence level (wants). Capitalist households do so in self-
organization, determining which firm sells the same good in a conspicuous way,
because worker households seek to imitate and follow this call for reputation by a
given weighting, as explained in the previous section.
Firms and banks interact on a simplified credit market, and banks interact with the
central bank. The state (government) collects taxes and uses them to finance social
transfers to pensioners and unemployed households. Government surpluses are equally
redistributed in the economy. As a very crude proxy to government bonds we assume
that banks and households finance the sovereign debt that exceeds available funds.
Fig. 2 General structure of the agent-based macroeconomic model
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3.1 Firms: consumer and capital goods production
We distinguish between two types of firms: producing capital goods and consumer
goods. In the simulation experiments presented in Section 4, a single capital goods
producing firm provides all consumer goods firms with machines and equipment,
i.e. the physical capital input for production. We maintain stock-flow consistency
since capital goods profits made on behalf of consumer goods producers’ invest-
ments are redistributed equally among capitalists in the economy. We simply
assume that investment goods are owned and thereby controlled collectively by
the capitalist class.
Each consumer goods firm has only one private owner, who is the sole receiver
of the firm’s profits. We choose this contrary to other published mechanisms, such
as dispersing profits to the whole population in relation to their wealth, as a proxy
for shares; see Dosi et al. (2010), Cincotti et al. (2010) or Lengnick (2013). The
latter, more aggregate and distributive, approach also leads to the rich getting
richer but ignores the possibility of individual failure – i.e. rich households can
never make a bad investment and thus go bankrupt more seldom than they should.
We regard this mechanism as highly problematic given the huge impact that
extreme developments of single agents can have in complex and highly
interconnected adaptive systems.2
We assume that consumer goods firms are on a market with boundedly rational
buyers who show satisficing rather than optimizing behavior, which on the
household side has different implications for needs and wants, as previously
elaborated in detail in Section 2. Firms initially determine the price on the basis
of their costs, adding some individual random markup – as empirically shown by
Fabiani et al. (2006) for the Euro area – while adapting price and output during the
regular simulation solely based on changes in consumer demand. There is no such
mechanism in mainstream macroeconomic theory; compared to traditional micro-
economics, this assumption can be associated with basic market power – in our
case, we would interpret the boundedly rational behavior in conjunction with a
preference to buy locally, leading to a market form with monopolistic competition.
Usually publications of macroeconomic ABMs avoid mentioning specific market
forms, instead stating that the interaction on markets should be empirically micro-
founded (Dosi et al. 2013), arguing that adding markup to costs is absolute
common practice in most real firms; see, e.g. Fabiani et al. (2006). Lengnick
(2013) stresses the argument even further that there is no market form in the
traditional microeconomic sense, only the result of endogenous interactions of
agents, which one could call a market.
Consumer goods firms use a simple short-run adaption strategy to determine
required production and pricing, which is based on the assumption that overall
demand might shift due to changes in consumer behavior, but that huge deviations
from previous prices are too risky. Preliminary simulation experiments have
shown that the influence of consumer behavior leads to much more stable econ-
omies when assuming that firms’ production schedules are directly determined by
expectations about sales rather than assuming only slight adaptions of previous
2 Compare Lengnick (2013) who devoted a whole section to the consequences of a small individual shock.
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production schedules based on previous sales. Thus, firms expect to sell as much
as in the last period (qsi;t−1) but factor in excess demand (q
ed
i;t−1).
qei;t ¼ qsi;t−1 þ qedi;t−1 ð5Þ
Nevertheless, in the spirit of Godley and Lavoie (2012), each firm i’s target is
to keep their inventory after sales (unsold goods) (qpsi;t−1) at the end of a period
at an optimal reserve level (qopti;t−1), proportional to the amount of goods previ-
ously produced (qppi;t−1), as they are prepared that actual sales might deviate from
their expectations, assuming that the firms all aim at the same constant pro-
portion of the previous stock (parameter α1):
qopti;t–1 ¼
qppi;t−1 α1
1þ α1 ð6Þ
Firms try to meet this level by, on the one hand, directly adjusting production and,
on the other hand, consider slightly adapting prices. Produced goods can be sold
in the same period as they are produced (firms produce and sell goods directly to
consumers). Overproduction (unsold stock) is stored until the next period but
depreciates. The intended production amount (qp
0
i;t) then factors in the expected
sales in t (qei;t), minding the desired reserve ratio after sales (α1), the intended
reserve stock as well as the depreciation of unsold goods. As qpsi;t represents the
amount of goods left after sales to households and parameter δ1 represents the
depreciation rate, we get:
qp
0
i;t ¼ qei;t 1þ α1ð Þ−qpsi;t 1−δ1ð Þ ð7Þ
Thus, in the unique case that there are more goods in the reserve inventory
than expected sales, the firm would even choose not to produce anything in this
period.
Independently of the planned production schedule, firms base their prices on the
previous period’s price (pi, t − 1) and consider changing the price by a fraction of a
simulation-specific maximum amount (pb), which is based on the average initial price
over all firms in t = 0 (pmt0 ).
pb ¼ pmt0α2 ð8Þ
The price change depends on the parameter α2 therefore, which is chosen rather small,
assuming that firms will not increase or decrease the price strongly in one period, and
on the deviation from the intended reserve stock (qopti;t ). If sales are much lower than
expected (qpsi;t−1 > 2q
opt
i;t ), then the price is decreased strongly:
p
0
i;t ¼ pi;t−1− 1þ α3ð Þpb ð9aÞ
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If sales were noticeably lower than expected (qopti;t–1 1þ α4ð Þ < qpsi;t−1≤2qopti;t ), then the
price is decreased in relation to the deviation from the planned reserves:
p
0
i;t ¼ pi;t−1−
qpsi;t−1−q
opt
i;t–1
qopti;t–1
pb ð9bÞ
If sales are roughly as expected, (
qopti;t–1
1þα4 ≤q
ps
i;t−1≤q
opt
i;t–1 1þ α3ð Þ), then the old price is retained:
p
0
i;t ¼ pi;t−1 ð9cÞ
If sales are noticeably higher than expected (0 < qpsi;t−1 <
qopti;t–1
1þα4), then the price is
increased in relation to the deviation from the planned reserves:
p
0
i;t ¼ pi;t−1 þ
qopti;t −q
ps
i;t−1
qopti;t
pb ð9dÞ
Finally, if sales are much higher than expected and there are no reserves left
(qpsi;t−1 ¼ 0), then the price is increased strongly:
p
0
i;t ¼ pi;t−1 þ 1þ α3ð Þpb ð9eÞ
The per-unit production costs (ACi, t) serve as the lower limit of the new price.
pi;t ¼ max ACi;t; p
0
i;t
 
ð10Þ
Finally, the new price (p
0
i;t) only becomes effective with a given probability (X1 > θ1
with X1~U(0, 1)) to cope for the fact that firms do not change prices that often.
Otherwise the old price (pi, t − 1) will be retained.
Consumer goods firms need physical capital (machines and equipment (xci;t)) and labor
(xli;t) as input factors for the production of goods. As previously indicated, firms buy
capital goods (i.e. physical capital in our model) from the capital goods firm.We employ a
simple linear, transformative production function at the firm level which uses a simple
capital intensity coefficient (α6). Furthermore, the production function features an associ-
ated heterogeneous production-technology coefficient per firm (ai, t) that was assumed to
be constant (ai, t =α5) for the performed simulation experiments presented in Section 4.
qi;t ¼ ai;tmin xci;tα6; xli;t
 
ð11Þ
After determining the intended production output as indicated, each firm i controls for
the required production inputs in order to produce (qp
0
i;t), starting with labor input (x
l
i;t):
xl
0
i;t ¼
q
0
i;t
ai;t
ð12Þ
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If firm i has not employed enough workers for the planned production schedule in the
last period (li
0
i;t > lii;t−1), then it scans the labor market for the current number of
unemployed (UNt* ). t∗ indicates the point of time within the period t where a decision
is made in random order. If the number of potential new employees is sufficient to
realize its production plan, i.e. if UNt* ≥ xl
0
i;t−xli;t−1
 
, then the production schedule
remains unchanged (q
0 0
i;t ¼ q
0
i;t). If it is not sufficient, then firm i reduces the planned
production output (q
0
i;t) to the highest possible quantity (q
00
i;t), given the actual number of
unemployed the firm is able to hire. Eventually it controls for the required physical
capital input (xc
0
i;t):
xl
0
i;t ¼
q
0
i;t
ai;t
ð13Þ
If firm i is confronted with less available physical capital than required
(xci;t−1 < x
c0
i;t), then it seeks to reinvest. Firms finance investments into physical
capital by means of loans, as assumed in the initial setup of the simulation.
They obtain further loans as long as their expected short-term profitability
remains high enough and their expected debt low enough. Thus, commercial
banks will not grant additional credit to firms if the debt exceeds the bankable
collateral, in order to limit their risk. To this effect, the aggregate loan volume
so far (with o indicating the period in which the loan was granted and b
indicating the respective bank) plus the newly requested loan amount (cr′i, t, b)
may not exceed the current value of their physical capital after investing. As the
value of physical capital regularly depreciates (each year by a fixed percentage),
the current value has to be calculated with wi, t representing the mean value of
firm i’s machines and cct being the price of one machine in t. Furthermore, as
there is much uncertainty associated with the future performance of the firm and
the consumer goods market in general, banks will only lend up to a fraction of
this sum, which is obtained by factoring in a bank-specific risk aversion
disposition (rab). The latter is identical (rab = ϕ1 for all banks b) for the
simulation experiments explained in Section 4. Ergo, the first firm loan condi-
tion has to hold:
∑cri;o;b þ cr0i;t;b≤ xci;t−1wi;t þ xc
0
i;t−x
c
i;t−1
 
cct
 
rab ð14Þ
Furthermore, banks will not grant more credit to firms if their estimated expected profit
rate is lower than the bank’s interest rate on firm loans (icb;t), so the second firm loan
condition has to hold additionally:
rei;t ≥ i
c
b;t ð15Þ
The expected profit rate is based on last period’s revenues and total costs per
period (TCi, t − 1). Thus banks are more risk-averse than firms and assume that
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sales will remain constant (qsi;t−1), while factoring in the additional costs for new
loans plus additional staff (ΔTCi, t).
rei;t ¼
12 qsi;t−1pi;t
 
− TCi;t−1 þΔTCi;t
  
xci;twi;t
ð16Þ
Firms now apply for the biggest loan cr0i;t;b≤ xc
0
i;t−xci;t−1
 
cct that is not violating
the two firm loan conditions set by the bank. Consequently, this notion might
even result in not applying for additional credit. Firms use this credit to buy
additional physical capital from the capital goods firm and thus arrive at a new
level (xci;t). Finally, firm i determines the highest possible production output
(qi;t ≤q
p0
i;t), and derives the corresponding required labor input (x
l
i;t). As the job
market is highly abstracted in this model, if firms need to hire additional workers
(if xli;t > x
l
i;t−1Þ, the required number of households is randomly drawn from the
number of unemployed households and employed at the respective firm. If the
firm has not received any additional loan to finance the necessary physical
capital or if it faces decreasing demand, labor input is reduced by firing random
workers from its staff. Otherwise, workers are employed with a legal protection
period (see Seppecher 2012 for an actual ABM that includes a labor market with
legal protection periods), as wages have to be paid two more months, thus
decreasing the effective production capacity.
If the situation worsens, and a firm’s expected profit rate (rei;t) is no longer
positive while at the same time its net liabilities exceed a multiple of its bankable
collateral, it goes bankrupt. As a consequence, the firm is foreclosed on, it leaves
the market, its customer relations are dissolved and the remaining assets plus
remaining loans are transferred to the bank where the firm had open credit
liabilities. In addition, if the firm defaults, the capitalist household transforms into
a worker agent but keeps its previous private account.
Workers in the same firm get the same wage, which may differ between companies,
but there is a countrywide minimum wage that has to be obeyed. At the end of each
year, firms with positive profits increase wages based on the increase of consumer
prices, whereas firms without or with negative profits keep wages constant, i.e. wages
are downward rigid.
At the end of a fiscal year, all firms calculate their profits, pay corporate taxes
to the government/state and distribute a large part of profits (after taxes) to the
firm’s owner, while the rest remains with the firm to cover future operational costs
(if positive profits existed).
3.2 Households
Additionally to the Veblenian meso foundation, explained in Section 2, house-
holds employ the following characteristics. In line with Lengnick (2013), wealth-
ier households are inclined to consume less of their disposable income.
Presupposing class-specific behavior, we assume (as a simplification) that workers
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tend to consume a large share of their income (β1), wealthy workers tend to
consume a slightly smaller share (β2), while finally capitalists tend to consume
an even smaller share again than the wealthy workers (β3). The disposable income
(maj;t) for workers is their monthly wage, whereas, for capitalists, we assume a
fictitious income equal to one-twelfth of last year’s dividends. Furthermore, we
assume that households with positive savings of all classes set aside a very small
share of their savings for additional consumption (msj;tγ1). Thus, depending on
their class-specific consumption share (βc, that is β1, β2, β3, respectively), house-
holds set their intended savings (sej;t) and consumption (c
e
j;t) to:
sej;t ¼ maj;t 1−βcð Þ ð17Þ
cej;t ¼ maj;t–sej;t þ msj;t γ1 ð18Þ
As prices and stock vary between vendors, these are the ex-ante decisions of
the household before consumption. The actual consumption therefore depends
on the respective prices and available stock of goods of each firm on household
j’s preference list in t:
cneedsj;t ¼ ∑
n
k¼1
pk;tq
needs
k;t ð19Þ
Each household j tries to buy equal quantities (qneedsk;t ) from each firm k on its preference
list as long as that firm is not yet out of stock (n ≤ γ1). In the special case that household
j’s total wealth in t (mj, t) is negative, i.e. when the household has no savings left
(msj;t ¼ 0) and the bank account is empty or overdrawn (maj;t ≤0), which is the only
form of household debt in the model, it is regarded as bankrupt. Households of all
classes may in this case only satisfy their needs by minimal subsistence consumption (a
fixed amount of goods purchased on overdraft) from their preferred vendors on the
respective shortlist (as explained in Section 2), i.e. c j;t ¼ cneedsj;t . In this context we refer
only to the bankruptcy of household agents. Since the account of the capitalist
household is listed separately from the firm’s account, we need to distinguish between
firm and household bankruptcy. Households that are not bankrupt try to satisfy their
wants by buying from their preferred vendors on the respective shortlist until the
remainder of their consumption budget (which was left after satisfying their needs) is
spent or until their preferred vendors are outsold. To avoid unrealistic goods allocation
situations, we split each period’s consumption ‘phase’ in multiple simulation phases (as
can be seen in Appendix 1), where, in a first phase, all households satisfy their needs
(cneedsj;t ). The remainder of household j’s budget set aside for consumption left after this
first phase is then available to satisfy their wants:
cwants;ej;t ¼ cej;t−cneedsj;t ð20Þ
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Thus, all households that still have some consumption budget left after satisfaction of
their needs (cwants;ej;t > 0), enter a second phase, in which capitalist households may
satisfy their wants first and worker households may satisfy their wants afterwards.
Inside these phases and thus within classes, order is random. Similarly, households now
try to buy the same quantity from all vendors on their respective preference lists, but
have to obey a budget restriction (cwants;ej;t ). They thus again pay different prices for
goods of each vendor.3 As a result, actual want (cwantsj;t ) and finally total consumption (cj,
t) may be smaller than the originally intended consumption (i.e. c j;t ≤cej;t), where:
c j;t ¼ cneedsj;t þ cwantsj;t ð21Þ
After the consumption phase, all households evaluate their preferred vendor lists as
elaborated in Section 2, seeking to find firms that better match their preferences, which
is a co-evolving process.
That part of household j’s income that was not set aside for consumption in t, i.e.
intended savings (sej;t), or could not be spent on consumption for whatever reason is
transferred from the bank account (maj;t) to the household’s savings account (m
s
j;t), with:
s j;t ¼ sej;t þ cej;t−c j;t ð22Þ
With a low probability, which increases for a quarter of a year after a firm has gone bankrupt,
a wealthy worker household may found a new firm of a given small initial size. The firm
will only be founded if there are still enough unemployed workers available on the labor
market. The wealthy worker who turned into a capitalist will then invest and thus transfer
money to the newly founded firm, to the amount that equals the cost of the physical capital
as well as operating cost for a given number of periods. In case the household does not have
enough savings to cover these founding costs, as a simplification the bank will implicitly
lend the money to the household (private debt) by allowing it to overdraw its bank account.
The new firmwill initially pay awage equivalent to the average of all wages paid by firms in
that period. Banks are assumed to act carefully rather than with greed regarding the granting
of additional credit. As a consequence, newly founded firms can only grow slowly at best, as
they would then have more credit than bankable collateral (i.e. physical capital).
3.3 Government and the state
The government assumes various roles in the model. It makes transfers to unemployed and
retired households, and collects taxes on labor, income and capital gains, corporate profits
made by banks and firms and by the capital goods firm, and value-added of sales. The
government budget in the model is never in perfect balance because of uncertainty about
both tax revenues and government expenditures – just as in reality. As unemployment
benefits and pensions are downward rigid, the government has no means to cut costs and
has to begin deficit spending if necessary. If indebted, it pays interest to banks and
3 In the simulation, this is achieved by consecutively buying small amounts from each vendor until the budget
left for the satisfaction of needs (cwant;ej;t ) is used up or the vendors on the list are outsold.
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households (in relation to their wealth) as a proxy for government bonds. As a simplifica-
tion, the government redistributes surpluses equally in the economy after every fiscal year.
3.4 The monetary sector: central bank and commercial banks
The central bank is lender of last resort for banks, and furthermore it provides
commercial bank services for states as a minor secondary/tertiary function. The central
bank keeps current accounts for the government (including overdraft functionality) and
banks, as well as deposit facilities for banks, involving the paying or charging of
interest. Banks keep current accounts for firms, the capital goods firm (which has
equally sized accounts with every bank as not to distort the banking system) and
households (allowing for deficits), as well as separate savings accounts for households.
In addition, they grant firm loans as described in section 3.1, whereas households
cannot apply for loans in a regular way, as described in section 3.2. They pay and
charge interest for these different financial services applying distinct rates, limited by
central bank interest rates. Banks have to refinance themselves by monitoring assets
(loans) and liabilities (savings). If banks lack liquidity, they request loans at the central
bank. Regular money is stored in bank accounts (which can – under specific conditions
– also be overdrawn, i.e. be negative) or in savings accounts (households). At the end of
a fiscal period, banks calculate their profits, pay corporate taxes to the government/state
and transfer a large part of profits (after taxes) to the bank’s owner.
4 Computational simulation experiments and results
In the followingwe choose a number of very different but highly artificial combinations of
household consumption behavior to demonstrate the endogenous self-organized structur-
ation of firm populations and corresponding macroeconomic outcomes. In order to show
the implications of the co-evolutionary dynamics in this agent-based macroeconomic
model,4 we have experimented with various configurations of consumption behavior, in
particular effecting the households’ replacement rules for needs as well as wants.
4.1 Simulation experiments and scenarios
4.1.1 Scenario CB1
Scenario CB1 is characterized – in Veblen’s terminology – by the instrumental pro-
clivities of the industrial society.5 In this scenario, we simply assume that all agents
consume according to the consumption behavior of ‘worker needs’, i.e. the needs and
wants replacement rules for the individual agent’s list of local firms follows Eqs. (1),
4 See Appendix 2 for technical details of the computational simulation.
5 Compare Tool (1977) for an introduction into Veblen’s conception of two different institutional systems in
the industrial society, “…they are institutions of acquisition or of production…they are pecuniary or industrial
institutions…” (Tool 1977: 827) Instrumental proclivities are associated with the instinct of workmanship that
characterizes, e.g., the engineer and the common production of goods. Otherwise, we find pecuniary
proclivities associated with the business enterprise and the leisure class. The latter tend to crowd out the
former in capitalist societies, a central thesis in Veblen’s work.
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(2), (3) and (4). Thus, all households consume only on behalf of a strong normal price
effect and a weak bandwagon quantity effect.
4.1.2 Scenario CB2
Scenario CB2 follows the same assumptions as CB1 but introduces a stronger social
mediation for wants. In this scenario, all households of all classes again replace their
individual firms’ preferences lists for needs as well as wants by Eqs. (1), (2), (3) and
(4). Contrary to scenario CB1, all households now discern needs and wants consump-
tion by assuming a stronger bandwagon effect for the latter (ξ = 0.25). Imitation of
wants consumption thus affects the whole population of households.
4.1.3 Scenario CB3
Scenario CB3 introduces a distinct consumption behavior of capitalists to CB1, i.e.
capitalists replace their firms’ preferences lists concerning wants consumption with
emphasis to snob-guided signaling-by-consuming. Capitalists replace their individual
firm lists in both the needs and the wants case with regard to the snob effect, but follow
a normal price effect. In this scenario, social distinction (Bourdieu 1984) dominates the
capitalist consumers concerning their wants, i.e. they aim to buy at rare firms and thus
act against the logic of bandwagon. Specifically, trickle-around effects (Trigg 2001) are
at work here since the snob effect may drive capitalist households to firms that have
previously been sought by workers.
4.1.4 Scenario CB4
Scenario CB4 represents a similar experiment as CB3 but with emphasis on signaling-
by-consuming just via the Veblen effect, while not acting on behalf of the snob effect.
In particular, capitalists aim to buy more expensive goods to satisfy their wants. This
scenario represents the Veblenian meso foundation of the social mediation of prefer-
ences (Veblen 1899) at best, where snob effects are not at work and social mediation
works just via trickle-down imitation (Trigg 2001). This scenario comes closest to the
one used by Kapeller and Schütz (2015) in their aggregated model.
4.1.5 Scenario CB5
Scenario CB5 substantiates Veblen’s dystopian vision of a society that has already
crowded out the instrumental proclivities and conspicuous consumption dominates in
the population. All households of all classes replace their firms’ preferences lists for
needs and wants as assumed for the capitalist needs and wants case; compare Fig. 1. In
this scenario, neither bandwagon nor normal price effects are active any longer.
Households aim to follow solely snob (quantity) and Veblen (price) effects.
4.1.6 Scenario CB6
Eventually, scenario CB6 is to be considered as the most likely scenario for Western
industrialized societies, as illustrated in Fig. 1. We assume all four modeled consumer
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behaviors are performed in this scenario, according to Leibenstein (1950). Workers
imitate capitalists with regard to their wants, while wealthy workers follow a weak
Veblen effect. Capitalists aim to act snobby in context of needs as well as wants but
give emphasis to conspicuous consumption in the wants case only. This scenario
combines all the mechanisms introduced in Section 2.6
4.2 Discussion of results
The data set generated via the previously described simulation experiments is
characterized by a high degree of complexity that we aim to analyze in our
following discussion of results. The simulation features high-granular ‘monthly’
data over 360 periods for a number of aggregated measures. Those figures that
show micro data contain the results of all 30 repetitions for each scenario. A
number of figures show annual numbers, which are averages over annual
aggregates of each scenario’s repetitions.
In our model, we have highlighted the role of consumption and class in an
evolving macroeconomic complex system. Social class was assumed – in line with
Wright (2015) – as a result of conflict over production, on the one hand, and the
expression of the situational level of power – ‘how to best realize interests under
fixed rules’ – on the other hand. Figure 3a and b show the evolution of the Lorenz
curve that is, first of all, characterized by a kink separating working from capitalist
class as a function of ownership over the means of production. As we assumed a
simple governmental social transfer mechanism in this experiment, which redis-
tributes potential budget surpluses equally, it is to be expected that the distribution
of wealth will become more equal over time under optimal economic conditions.
Figure 3a shows that scenario CB5 leads to a less equal distribution of wealth over
time, as unemployment reaches levels where considerable numbers of worker
households are effectively bankrupt, as the level of unemployment benefits is less
often increased than wages. Prolonged periods of high unemployment in CB5
eventually lead to the government budget going into deficit. Fig. 3b, on the other
hand, shows that income, which is the sum of wages and capital gains per
household, does not change that strongly after the initial phase and that scenario
CB5 leads to income being more equally distributed than in the other scenarios
(compare Fig. 4). The main reason for this starkly different development of CB5 is
that there are not any regular price effects. Initially, the excess demand for the
goods of individual firms lead to high prices and to more frequent increases in
prices than in wages – as the former can change monthly and the latter is settled
annually. Correspondingly, this effect decreases wants consumption, as an increas-
ing share of the wages has to be paid for needs consumption. In consequence, we
are dealing with excess labor capacities in the short run. Although these would
even out in the long run, some households become unemployed and further reduce
their demand before they would receive a wage increase (due to the cumulated
increase in prices) countering the effect. The different speeds of adaptation – that
our model centrally features – lead to lags and thus imperfections across the
6 Compare Appendix 3 for the analytical specifications of individual updating rules for signaling-by-
consuming effects.
Consumption & class in evolutionary macroeconomics
markets (goods, labor and credit). In addition, some firms go bankrupt and as all
households show the same behavioral inclinations in CB5, their demand focuses
on fewer firms, which, are unable to grow quickly enough – no Cobb-Douglas
adaptation of input factors – to deal with the excess demand. Eventually, these
effects lead scenario CB5 into stagflation until the economy stabilizes at higher
nominal price and wage levels (compare Figs. 7, 8 and 9).
Social class conditions particular patterns of consumption behavior that oth-
erwise influences firm specialization. Figure 5 illustrates micro data from the
conducted experiments – including all repetitions – for relative price in relation
to each firm’s share of needs consumption. It especially highlights the different
effects stemming from the meso foundation with regard to snob (CB3) as well as
Veblen (CB4) consumption in the capitalist class on firm evolution. The resulting
dynamics indicate, that, in general a high relative price corresponds to a low
needs share in consumption. That said, we otherwise observe a high wants share
if relative prices are high, with exception of scenario CB5, where households
purchase needs in a conspicuous fashion as well. The specifications of CB5
undermine firm specialization and hence the emergence of a deeper structure in
the industry. This conclusion is also true for CB1, where households follow just
the normal price effect and a rather weak bandwagon effect. By contrast CB6
leads to the emergence of such a deeper structure in the industry and resembles a
Fig. 4 Distribution of wages
Fig. 3 a Evolution of the Lorenz curve – wealth. b Evolution of the Lorenz curve – income.
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scenario of firm specialization as is common to Western industrialized societies.
Firm populations endogenously evolve with broad price spreads where a sub-
population of firms specializes on the production of expensive wants. This
simulation result demonstrates the evolutionary core of this agent-based macro-
economic model.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of capitalist consumers over firms for all scenarios
over time by showing the results of all repetitions (reruns). All scenarios start rather
homogeneously in t = 1, while evolving quite distinct behavioral capitalist consump-
tion patterns for the different scenarios, which are rather well defined with regard to
the variation of the random element (repetitions). Here we can particularly differen-
tiate the dynamics of CB3 and CB4. The snob effect drives capitalists to consume
goods from smaller firms in CB3 and leads to the formation of a distinguished set of
firms, which appears as an emerging peak in the relative frequency. Signaling-by-
consuming leads hereby to a self-organized structuration process that is reshaping the
almost normal distribution of capitalist consumers over firms in the very beginning.
After 15–20 years, capitalist consumers are distributed differently, resulting in a
bimodal distribution with two local maxima. Otherwise, in CB4 capitalists follow a
Veblen effect and act conspicuously. As a consequence, capitalist consumers are
more uniformly distributed in this scenario but prefer firms with higher prices, thus
spreading over a higher number of firms. In scenario CB2, all households, including
capitalists, are subject to a stronger bandwagon effect, which leads capitalist house-
holds to spread over an even higher number of firms.
Fig. 5 Firm specialization: needs share vs. relative price
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In conclusion, the snob effect – as a contradictory force to bandwagon – may be
even “innovative” in this regard – compare Tarde (1903: xiv) and Lepinay (2007: 531–
535) for invention and imitation – since it creates variety and diversity. In this regard,
our results reproduce the microeconomic conclusions drawn by Malerba et al. (2007)
and Safarzynska and van den Bergh (2010) on larger scale. This diversity in firm
specialization guarantees a steady movement of consumers and a replacement of firms
by consumers if a bandwagon effect is at work (CB3 and CB6).
Analysis of the firm specialization processes (Figs. 5 and 6) reveals different path-
dependent structuration patterns characterized by different price levels plus the share of
needs and wants. That said, the investigated signaling-by-consuming effects – the
Veblenian meso foundation – have a significant influence on the price level of the
economy, which we aim to highlight in Fig. 7. It shows the development of the price
level in terms of a weighted consumer price index. Due to the random initial household
– firm matching, households’ initial behavior does not very well reflect their true
preferences on the consumer goods market. As a result, households are unsatisfied
and often change their firms’ preferences lists, since the firms’ specialization – and
hence, its adaptation to differentiated demand – has not come through yet on the supply
side. Thus, the price level rises quickly during the first five years, as firms often face
excess demand during this period, which results in frequent price increases. Scenario
CB5 is again special as it leads to a much longer phase of price increases that stabilizes
only after 15 years of high price inflation. All the other scenarios indicate a rather
steady development in the consumer price index.
Fig. 6 Firm specialization: capitalist consumer share
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Moreover, the analysis of the dynamics in the consumer price index corresponds
very well with the simulation data on excess supply. Since our model works without a
market clearing mechanism, actual sales might deviate from the firms’ expectations. To
this extent, the relative excess supply – shown in Fig. 8 – demonstrates the deviation
from the planned reserve stock for the various scenarios. This notion means in
particular that in all scenarios – except CB5 – firms are fighting with grave expectation
mismatches in the very first years, but lock into an effective inventory reserve rate –
5.5% away from the intended rate (α1 = 0.1) – for the inventory of ~4.5% on average
thereafter. By contrast, firms in CB5 are far away from their planned reserves in the
inventory, i.e. they are regularly outsold. Only after 15 years do firms reach the same
practical reserve rate of ~4.5%, as achieved in the other scenarios. Within those first
Fig. 7 Consumer price index
Fig. 8 Excess supply in relation to total supply
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15 years, the demand for a specific firms’ goods is too high due to the snob effect and
conspicuous consumption prevalent in all classes. However, households change their
firms’ preference lists far too often and therefore prohibit steady capacity adjustments
for the firms. The intuitive response on the supply side is given by substantial price
increases, as we have already highlighted in Fig. 7.
Furthermore, the limited excess supply and the corresponding high price inflation in
CB5 translate into higher firm profits, as shown in Fig. 9. The profit rates are in general
rather low (~2–3%) if bandwagon and normal price effects are active in the working
class. Otherwise in CB5 we see firms’ profits growing very fast, peaking at a profit rate
of ~15%. These additional capital gains make the Veblen effect even more pronounced
and luxury want consumption increases because of this feedback loop, and so the
economy destabilizes endogenously.
Turning attention to a central macroeconomic measure – aggregate demand – reveals
the structuration stemming from the dynamic interdependency of the endogenous social
mediation of consumer preferences and firm specialization. Results are illustrated in
Fig. 10 showing the aggregate demand for consumer goods in the economy, separated
for the previously described artificial scenarios. The Veblenian meso foundation is
decisive for the emergent outcome on the macro scale, since aggregate demand differs
substantially around 5% between the different path-dependent developments. The
exception is again given by CB5, where only the snob and Veblen effects are active.
In this scenario, aggregate demand immediately decreases by 10% over the first
10 years, resulting in a difference of 15–20 percentage points to the other scenarios.
Note that aggregate demand equals household consumption, but does not include
unsatisfied demand of households, i.e. it does not equal the sum of the intended
consumption of households.
Why is there such a slump in aggregate demand in CB5 within the first 10 years
while all the other scenarios indicate a steady growth in aggregate demand? On the one
hand it is not possible for all households to consume rare and luxury goods in an
economy that starts out with medium-sized firms. On the other hand, the bandwagon
Fig. 9 Mean profit rate of firms
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effect – active in all scenarios except CB5 – functions as a social stabilizer for the
macroeconomic performance, it guarantees a persistent flow of household consump-
tion. Thus firms followed by a critical mass of households – ‘jumping on the band-
wagon’ – can grow steadily into large-scale corporations with a high needs share and a
low price (see Fig. 5 again). Furthermore, these firms are then able to sustain the slowly
increasing demand via continuous capacity adjustments in comparison to smaller firms
selling a higher wants share with relatively higher prices. These latter firms serve the
capitalists’ desires and do not contribute to an increase in aggregate demand as great as
the larger firms that are followed on the basis of the bandwagon effect. Otherwise, this
notion means that in the absence of bandwagon and normal price effects accompanied
by a stark presence of snob and Veblen effects – as it is the case in CB5 –, the economy
destabilizes dramatically owing to snob effect and conspicuous consumption. Firms, on
the one hand, cannot expect a comparable persistence in consumption flows and, on the
other, they cannot increase steadily their prices as a reaction to the demonstrative
spending behavior in all social classes now, as shown in the previous figures. The
increasing inflation (Fig. 7) eventually leads to the slump in aggregate demand, since
prices are adjusted monthly (see Fig. 11) but wages only annually. As a consequence,
we can observe these fundamentally different macroeconomic developmental paths.
In addition, we aim to highlight the fact, that these macroeconomic conclu-
sions are significantly robust, having been drawn from the analysis of stable
system behavior generated by our simulation experiments. The robustness of
such results depends, of course, on the complexity of the agent-based model,
but more specifically on the proportional relations of assumptions made. Monthly
data as presented in Fig. 11 for aggregate demand show the slight seasonal
fluctuations. These are also influenced by annual changes in capital gains, which
are distributed once per year and thus affect capitalist household consumption
behavior more strongly. Moreover, repetitions of the same parameter combina-
tions (scenarios) fluctuate less strongly between repetitions of more stable sce-
narios, e.g. CB6, and more strongly for rather unstable scenarios, e.g. CB5.
Fig. 10 Aggregate demand – annual
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Eventually, Fig. 12 shows the path-dependent development in the labor market
by indicating the unemployment rate in the economy. The differences among the
scenarios are pronounced and substantiate the previous analysis. A close inspec-
tion of scenario CB5 shows a maximum unemployment rate peaking at 16%, and,
more specifically, a higher variance between repetitions than in other scenarios.
Although reducing to lower levels in the long run, this particular social mediation
of consumer preferences turns the economy into severe macroeconomic turmoil.
Otherwise, all other scenarios tend to stabilize after peaking between years five
and 10 to very low unemployment rates between two and 4 %. The comparatively
volatile developments during the first ten years represent the manifestations of the
self-organization process restructuring the market for consumer goods, as it
Fig. 12 Unemployment rate
Fig. 11 Aggregate demand – monthly
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develops away from the artificial initial conditions. Furthermore, the analysis of
the unemployment rate substantiates our previous conclusions about the role of the
bandwagon effect for evolutionary macro dynamics. We can report its stabilizing
role, this time with regard to long-run employment.
At this point, we could project that a further introduction of a complementary
Schumpeterian meso foundation – on innovation and technological change –
would increase labor productivity and counteract the bandwagon effect. This
setting would lead to technological unemployment, at least in the short run –
caused, e.g., by increasing automation – and counteract the bandwagon effect in
terms of aggregate demand and employment. However, a clear comparative
analysis of both evolutionary meso effects (Veblenian plus Schumpeterian) in
action goes far beyond the scope of this article, but indicates stimulating research
potential for the future.
5 Concluding remarks
Evolutionary macroeconomics offers a new approach by employing computational
social simulation of dynamic micro-meso-macro frameworks. We understand
evolutionary macroeconomics as an integral part of evolutionary political econo-
my that can shed light on the dynamic effects of specified agent heterogeneity and
diversity for typical macro aggregates. These measures imply welfare effects for
individual agents in political economy terms, with actual losers and winners. In
our article, we presented such an evolutionary macroeconomic model – specified
along a Veblenian meso foundation – and analyzed the long-run welfare effects for
capitalists as well as workers by means of artificial simulation experiments.
To this effect, the micro level of the macroeconomic system is not reduced to a
representative micro foundation but entails a population of heterogeneous
interacting agents and so evolves as a complex adaptive system. Basic information
sharing among agents via simple communication structures is a necessary charac-
teristic for a meso foundation that is socializing agent collectives through common
patterns of political economic behavior. The significant difference between a
micro and a meso foundation relates to this latter property. Micro may guarantee
for heterogeneity but cannot involve diversity in a population of economic agents.
Otherwise, a meso foundation generates a diversity of distinguishable agent
collectives within the whole population (Scholz-Wäckerle 2017). It thereby
modularizes the full set of heterogeneous agents into different subsets (Simon
1962) and creates social structure. In our model, this social structure is character-
ized by the endogenous development of Marxian social classes and Veblenian
social stratification.
The agent-based methodology allows the implementation of such an evolutionary
macroeconomic complex adaptive system with a specified meso foundation. In
addition, this approach enables the complementary performance of bottom-up self-
organization (households, firms, banks) vis-à-vis top-down governance (govern-
ment, central bank). In this article, we have demonstrated the explanatory power of
evolutionary macroeconomics with a concrete example, in particular a Veblenian
meso foundation with signaling-by-consuming effects, dependent on social class.We
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have shown that the co-evolutionary dynamics between household behavior and firm
specialization lead to the emergence of some deeper structure in the consumer goods
market, on the one hand, and to significantly different macroeconomic outcomes in
simulation experiments, on the other. The social mediation of consumption plays a
crucial role for the path-dependent development of an economy.
First, the bandwagon effect acts as an endogenous stabilizer for the macroeconomic
system. It facilitates steady growth in aggregate demand. Second, the snob effect leads to
a bimodal distribution – by endogenously restructuring the market for consumer goods –
of firms, with larger and relatively low-price firms serving the needs of the working class
and smaller and relatively high-price firms serving the wants of the wealthy workers and
capitalists. Third, the combination of snob and Veblen effect in the capitalist class is the
only signaling-by-consuming mix that may cause stagflationary economic turmoil on
the macro scale if it is not compensated by a normal price and bandwagon effect in the
working class. To sum up, the working class stabilizes the macroeconomic system by
consuming in accordance with a normal price effect with its bandwagon-guided needs
consumption. The capitalist class destabilizes it by consumption according to the Veblen
effect with its snob-guided wants consumption. Although the latter keeps the economy
in continuous change, creates variety and diversity in patterns of consumption and
changes the firm population endogenously, it needs to get complemented by working-
class consumption behavior or it turns the economy down. If the banks are modeled as
being risk-averse, grant loans quite conservatively and firms therefore do not grow
explosively – as is the case in our conducted simulation experiments – these comple-
mentary (and to some extent co-evolutionary) dynamics lead to a stable macroeconomic
development path. However, the achieved stability may get disrupted once the working
class switches to snob and Veblen effects in their needs consumption as well. This notion
may be problematic in an economy where consumption is made exclusively on easily
available private loans, as it is a tendency in financial capitalism.
In conclusion, evolutionary macroeconomics – following the agent-based method-
ology – provides new insights on the inner dynamics of an economy with regard to its
multileveled structure. The advantage of the presented approach lies in the simulta-
neous analysis of micro, meso and macro components. One can test social theories of
endogenous change – such as Veblen’s theory of the leisure class – in macroeconomic
environments. The individual agents are modeled under terms of bounded rationality
and satisficing rules of thumb, but social adaptation characterizes them as heteroge-
neous and diverse decision makers within a complex evolving system.
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Appendix 1 – Timing of events
Monthly simulation phases
Founding phase
Households evaluate and initiate firm founding
Production phase
Firms make demand estimation and pricing
Firms make credit adjustment and production
Firms adapt prices
Sales and consumption phase
Households check financial status
Households decide consumption budget
Households buy needs goods
Households (capitalists) buy wants goods
Households (workers) buy wants goods
Households update needs vendor lists
Households update wants vendor lists
Households balance accounts with savings if indebted or declare bankruptcy
Wages payment phase
Firms pay wages
Government pays pensions
Government pays unemployment subsidies
Saving phase
Households transfer money to savings accounts
Interest and consolidation phase
Banks collect loans interest
Banks collect loans repayments
Banks calculate accounts interest
Banks calculate savings interest
Banks pay central bank loans interest
Banks pay central bank loans repayments
Firms’ monthly accounting
Banks verify firms’ solvency
Banks’ monthly accounting
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Banks calculate refinancing demands
Banks refinance themselves at central bank
Banks transfer funds to facilities at central bank
Central bank pays reserve interest
Central bank pays deposit facilities interest
Government refinancing phase
Update macro indicators
Banks’ monthly accounting
Central bank’s monthly accounting
Government’s monthly accounting
Country updates macro indicators
Annual simulation phases
Annual accounting phase
Banks collect and pay accounts interest
Banks pay savings interest
Firms calculate profits and pay taxes
Banks calculate profits and pay taxes
Firms distribute profits
Banks distribute profits
Capital goods firms distribute profits
Government updates annual statistics (annual taxes)
Country compiles annual report
Government checks minimum wage increase
Government increases unemployment subsidies if minimum wage increased
Government evaluates pension increase based on CPI
Firms evaluate wage increases based on CPI
Capital goods firm adapts prices based on CPI
Firms depreciate production capital
Appendix 2 – Technical details of the computational simulation
To implement the computational simulation of the presented model we chose the
widely used Netlogo simulation environment (Wilensky 1999) in the version 5.2
without any special Netlogo extensions.
The presented experiment was set up using Netlogo’s built-in BehaviorSpace
experiment management engine to repeat each scenarios 30 times, each time using a
different random seed to account for the random factors in the model. This resulted in
180 different simulation runs, which were calculated in parallel on multiple computers.
Aggregate time series data were generated directly by BehaviorSpace for each period,
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whereas micro data were only saved for selected periods. Data analysis and visualiza-
tion was realized using the R language (with the ggplot2 package). Annual data shown
are either means over the periods representing a year (flows) or the state in the last
period of an artificial year (stocks).
The experiments were run with 5000 households including workers, pensioners
and capitalists, and started with an initial firm population of 250 firms. Addition-
ally the experiment included five banks and a rudimentary capital goods firm, the
government and a central bank. Other relevant simulation parameters are shown in
the table below.
Main simulation parameters
Households
Number of vendors on preferred lists (γ2) 7
Number of regular replacement checks per month 1
Reserves of needs 1 period
Intended consumption rate, worker households (β1) 0.1
Intended consumption rate, wealthy worker households (β2) 0.15
Intended consumption rate, capitalist households (β3) 0.2
Rate of consumption with respect to savings (γ1) 0.05 / 12
Initial savings endowment of worker households X2 ∗ annual wagehousehold X2~U(1, 2)
Initial savings endowment of capitalist households 10 ∗ (initial minimum wage)
Firms
Initial ratio capital (individual firm level) to wages (annual) 2
Production reserve stock rate (α1) 0.1
Unsold stock depreciation rate (per period) (δ1) 0.5
Capital depreciation rate (annual) 0.1
Firm founding probability (monthly) 1/18
Price adjustment rate (α2) 0.01
Maximum price adjustment (α3) 0.1
Stock adjustment indifference rate (α4) 0.25
Common fixed production technology coefficient (α5) 1
Capital intensity parameter (α6) 0.2
New price adoption probability (θ1) 1/3
Banks
Credit term 5 years
Credit interest rate (annual) 0.04
Account interest rate (annual) 0.01
Account overdraft rate (private credit, annual) 0.05
Savings interest rate (annual) 0.015
Firm credit risk parameter (ϕ1) 0.5
Central bank deposit interest rate (annual) 0.01
Central bank loans interest rate (annual) 0.02
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Government
Initial minimum wage 1000
Initial unemployment subsidy 1000
Minimum wage increase minimal interval 5 years
Employment protection duration 2 months
Value added tax rate 0.1
Labor tax rate (flat for all worker households) 0.15
Income tax rate (flat for all capitalist households) 0.15
Capital gains tax rate 0.15
Corporate tax rate (banks, firms, capital goods firm) 0.15
Appendix 3 – Signaling by consuming effects (Section 2/Fig. 1)
Worker needs
b1;i;t ¼
pmax;t−pi;t
pmax;t−pmin;t
 !
ð23Þ
b2; j;t ¼ mmax;t−mj;tmmax; t−mmin;t
 
ð24Þ
b3;i;t ¼ vi;t−vmin;tvmax;t−vmin;t
 
ð25Þ
Ui; j;t ¼ b1;i;tb2; j;tξ þ b3;i;t 1−ξð Þ ð26Þ
As presented in Section 2, ξ = 0.75 in this case.
Worker wants
Signaling-by-consuming in the case of worker wants is defined according to Eqs. (23),
(24), (25) and (26) by setting ξ = 0.25. In this case we put a much stronger weight on
the bandwagon effect than on the price effect.
Wealthy worker wants
bv1;i;t ¼
pi;t−pmin;t
pmax;t−pmin;t
 !
ð27Þ
Ui; j;t ¼ bv1;i;tb2; j;tξ þ b3;i;t 1−ξð Þ ð28Þ
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Signaling-by-consuming in the case of wealthy worker wants is defined according to
Eqs. (27), (24), (25) and (28). Again ξ = 0.25, assigning a much stronger weight on the
bandwagon effect than on the price effect. Additionally the price effect (now bv1) is now
a Veblen effect and thus reversed in comparison to cases 1 and 2.
Capitalist needs
bs3;i;t ¼
vmax;t−vi;t
vmax;t−vmin;t
 
ð29Þ
Ui; j;t ¼ b1;i;tb2; j;tξ þ bs3;i;t 1−ξð Þ ð30Þ
Signaling-by-consuming in the case of capitalist needs is defined according to Eqs.
(23), (24), (29) and (30). In the capitalist cases ξ = 0.5, thus putting equal weights on the
bandwagon and price effects. The price effect is again a regular price effect as in cases 1
and 2 (though less strong as ξ is chosen differently), but will implicitly get less
important for very wealthy capitalists, as the wealth weight b will reduce its effect.
Furthermore, cs now represents a snob effect.
Capitalist wants
Ui; j;t ¼ bv1;i;tb2; j;tξ þ bs3;i;t 1−ξð Þ ð31Þ
Signaling-by-consuming in the case of capitalist wants is defined according to Eqs.
(27), (24), (29) and (31). Again ξ = 0.5 thus putting equal weights on the bandwagon
and price effects. The price effect (now bv1) is a Veblen effect like in the case of
capitalist needs while bs3 again represents a snob effect.
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